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1 Introduction 
Unemployment in Europe, notably youth unemployment, is not only unbearably high, it is 
also unbearably different across nations that belong to an economic and monetary union. It is 
divergent across countries (more so than across regions), so that talking about a European 
unemployment problem or even more so a European structural unemployment problem is 
highly misleading. 
In this paper we note that this heterogeneity cannot be accounted for only by the size or even 
by the nature of shocks experienced in the various countries. It is also largely unrelated to 
region-specific (and presumably sector-specific) evolutions within each country. The 
European unemployment divergence is largely to do with differences in labour market 
institutions across countries, notably the way in which these different institutions have 
reacted to shocks. Learning from these interactions between shocks and institutions is 
essential not only for devising structural reforms, but also for improving fiscal policy 
coordination in Europe.  
We argue that EU policy coordination and conditionality vis-à-vis highly indebted countries 
were poorly exerted during the Great Recession. On account of the incompleteness and the 
imperfection of economic and monetary union (EMU), there has been a lack of instruments to 
address the asymmetric effects of demand shocks across member countries. Even when some 
advances were made in the fiscal policy framework, too much emphasis was placed on the 
notion of structural unemployment, whether this was the non-accelerating wage rate of 
unemployment (NAWRU) or the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). 
This turns out to be very risky since long-term trends and the long-lasting effects of the crisis 
on the relationships between macroeconomic variables make it more and more difficult to 
disentangle structural and cyclical unemployment, and, in fact, the several measures of 
structural unemployment, however defined, fluctuate too much over time to qualify as 
structural. 
Admittedly, there have been some improvements in the policy coordination framework of the 
EU, but conditionality over countries, whether or not they were subject to formal rescue 
programmes, was poorly exerted. Some key reforms were lost in translation, while others 
were enforced without taking into account their effects over the business cycle. 
We begin with some facts about country-specific unemployment trajectories and then move 
on to analyse the role played by institutions, shocks and the interactions between shocks and 
institutions in these trajectories. In this context, we look at outliers in Okun’s relationship and 
introduce some new microeconomic evidence on how firms adjusted to different shocks that 
has come from a new wave of a survey of European firms across 25 countries, conducted by 
the ESCB’s Wage Dynamics Network. The final sections draw policy implications from our 
analysis, substantiating our negative views of the policy responses to unemployment during 
the crisis, and motivating a proposal for changes to the European policy approach for fighting 
unemployment.  
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2 Why unemployment is so high and divergent in Europe 
2.1 Some key facts 
Throughout the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009, 
unemployment in the United States was consistently higher 
than in the European Union. Five years down the road from 
the global crisis, EU unemployment is almost twice as high 
as in the United States (Chart 1a). In the 19 countries of the 
euro area it is actually more than twice as high as it is on the 
other side of the Atlantic. In Europe, unemployment is not 
only stubbornly high, but it is also very unevenly distributed 
across countries and population groups. There is clear 
evidence that since 2007 the dispersion of unemployment 
rates within the euro area has increased much more than in 
previous recessions; the gap between the average 
unemployment rate of the four euro area countries with the 
highest unemployment rates and that of the four euro area 
countries with the lowest unemployment rates is more than 
15 percentage points. A similar comparison in the United 
States, between the averages of the ten states with the highest 
and ten states with the lowest unemployment rates, yields a 
gap of less than 5 percentage points (Chart 1b).  
Chart 1a 
Unemployment rates from 2000 to 2015: European Union, 
euro area, United States and Japan 
(percentages) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Notes: EA-19 refers to the 19 countries of the euro area, while EU-28 denotes the 28 countries of 
the European Union. 
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Chart 1b 
Cross-country (EU and euro area) and cross-state (United States) unemployment rates  
(percentages) 
 
 
Unlike the United States, Europe has not experienced a 
decline in participation rates, and, in fact, the level of labour 
supply in proportion to the working age population, which 
was higher in the United States than in Europe before the 
Great Recession, is now converging across the two sides of 
the Atlantic (Chart 2a). Also, in stark contrast with previous 
recessions, where soft-landing schemes to retirement were 
widely used by firms attempting to downsize, employment 
rates among older workers have actually increased in most 
European countries throughout the Great Recession and the 
euro area debt crisis (Chart 2b).1 
                                                                            
1  The convergence in European and US labour force participation rates for workers aged 15-64 should not hide 
large differences in the degree of mobilisation of labour supply among older workers. Employment rates for 
workers aged 65 or more are close to 20% in the United States and Japan, but lower than 10% in the EU. When 
the employment rate is computed for the population over 15 years of age, it is 8 percentage points higher in the 
United States than in the euro area.  
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Chart 2a 
Employment and participation rates in Europe and the United States 
(percentage of population aged 15-64) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Note: Data for the EU include only 21 countries because for these variables there are no homogeneous long-time series available for the EU-28.  
A main driver of European cross-country differences in 
unemployment is youth unemployment, which stands above 
(often well above) 40% in southern Europe while remaining 
at single-digit levels in Austria and Germany. As shown by 
Casado, Fernández-Vidaurreta and Jimeno (2015), during 
this recession job losses were highly concentrated among 
younger workers. Thus the explosion of youth unemployment 
was, unlike in previous recessions, not only related to a 
hiring freeze, but also to the heavy destruction of jobs held 
by young people, with the dissolution of temporary contracts, 
while at the same time employment rates among older 
workers were increasing (Chart 3).  
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Chart 2b 
Employment rates among older workers in 2000 and 2013 
(percentage of population aged 55-64) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Chart 3 
Changes in the probability of transiting between employment and unemployment between 2007 and 2012 for people of 
different ages, genders and education levels in various European countries 
(annual flows in percentage points) 
From employment to unemployment 
 
From unemployment to employment 
 
From unemployment to employment 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on data from the European Labour Force Survey. 
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These two distinguishing features of labour market adjustment in Europe since the Great 
Recession – the cross-country heterogeneity in unemployment rates, notably among young 
people, and the increase in labour supply – appear therefore to be closely interrelated. We 
will now discuss whether they can be attributed to institutional features or to differences 
within and between countries in the intensity and characteristics of shocks. 
2.2 Variation between countries vs. variation within countries  
Some preliminary indications as to the role played by shocks and labour market institutions 
in these developments can be identified by disentangling evolutions between countries from 
those within countries as typically institutions vary more across rather than within countries 
while shocks tend to be concentrated on specific regions and sectors. Given the high 
concentration of increases in job destruction and decreases in job creation among the younger 
cohorts, we focus on youth unemployment to perform this decomposition. 
In particular, we treat the EU as a single unit, and compute two well-known indexes of 
inequality (the Gini and the Theil indexes). They both show a noticeable increase in 
dispersion (inequality) of youth unemployment rates across EU regions throughout the Great 
Recession. The overall Theil index, for example, climbed from 13% in 2007 to 21% in 2013, 
an increase of eight percentage points. This regional dispersion can be broken down into 
variations within countries and between countries, according to the following formula2:  
𝑇𝑇 =  ∑ �𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘
𝑟𝑟
𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘����
𝑢𝑢�
�𝑚𝑚𝐾𝐾=1 𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 + ∑ �𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟 𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘����𝑢𝑢� �𝑚𝑚𝐾𝐾=1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘����𝑢𝑢� �  
 
 
The first component, Twithin, expresses the weighted average of the Theil indexes of each sub-
group of NUTS-2 regions, which is the dispersion rate of youth unemployment due to the 
variability within countries of youth unemployment rates at the regional level. The second 
component, Tbetween, captures inequality between EU countries, basically computing the Theil 
by using the countries’ mean values of regional youth unemployment rates. As can be seen 
from Table 1, from 2007 to 2013 the Tbetween increased from 8% to 18%. On the contrary, 
regional divergence within each country decreased, with a reduction in the Twithin from 7% to 
4%. Thus, the growing dispersion of European youth unemployment rates appears to have a 
marked national dimension. Similar qualitative results arise when performing this 
decomposition on the overall unemployment rates. 
                                                                            
2  The notation is as follows: m is the total number of EU Member States, r is the total number of NUTS-2 regions, 
rk is the number of NUTS-2 regions in country k, 𝑢𝑢� is the average youth unemployment rate in the EU, 𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘��� is the 
average youth unemployment rate of NUTS-2 regions in country k and Tk is the Theil index of country k.  
Twithin Tbetween 
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Table 1 
Measures of dispersion of youth unemployment rates 
Regional dispersion of youth unemployment 2007 2013 Variation 
EU regions (NUTS-2 level)    
Gini index 29% 37% 28% 
Theil index (total) 13% 21% 58% 
Theil within 7% 4% -48% 
Theil between 8% 18% 135% 
 
2.3 Okun in Europe 
In addition to labour market institutions, national (as opposed to regional) differences in the 
size of macroeconomic shocks may have been responsible for the increasing cross-country 
divergence in unemployment rates.  
A very crude way to assess the relative importance of institutions and shocks in 
unemployment dynamics is in terms of Okun’s law elasticities. Deviations from the overall 
euro area elasticity can be attributed to labour market institutions, while different country 
positioning along the same unemployment-GDP or employment-GDP elasticity can be 
related to the magnitude of the macro shock. Needless to say, part of the output fall itself can 
be attributed to labour market institutions (in their role as sources of shocks or in the 
transmission mechanism of shocks generated elsewhere), but, with very few exceptions that 
we highlight below, during the Great Recession the effects of shocks generated in the labour 
market on output are relatively second order. 
Chart 4 
Accumulated variations in unemployment and output between 2007 and 2013 
(log-differences) 
 
Sources: Authors´ calculations on Eurostat and OECD data.  
Note: The y-axis shows changes in unemployment rates and the x-axis shows the accumulated change in GDP throughout the period. 
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Chart 4 provides a visual representation of this admittedly rough decomposition. It plots the 
cumulated output (horizontal axis) and unemployment (vertical axis) variations over the 
period 2007-2013.3 The message is rather clear. Just over one-half of the variation (about 
52%) in national unemployment rates is related to a different exposure to shocks per given 
beta coefficient. The cumulated growth rates in GDP during the period 2008-2013 range from 
almost -30% in Greece to more than +10% in Slovakia. Some features of the current crisis, 
from its different nature across countries (i.e. the presence and magnitude of housing bubbles 
in the pre-crisis period and the depth of financial markets) and the different policy responses 
(i.e. fiscal and external financing problems and bail-out issues), to the influence of the labour 
market in the transmission of fundamental shocks and lack of automatic stabilisers at the 
country level, explain the dispersion in GDP growth rates and, hence, in unemployment rates.  
The remaining 50% of the variation is not explained by GDP 
variation. As Chart 4 shows, there are some outliers in the 
relationship between GDP growth rates and unemployment 
variation: Spain and Germany, most notably (also Finland 
and Slovakia, to some extent). Labour market institutions and 
employment policies, mostly (but not only) by determining 
the degree of labour hoarding in response to shocks, are 
likely to be behind this residual source of unemployment 
divergence in the euro area during the Great Recession. The 
fact that Okun’s coefficients turned out to be higher in 
countries with dual employment protection legislation (Chart 
5) also confirms that cross-country differences in labour 
market institutions are important determinants of the 
divergence of unemployment in Europe. 
A simple decomposition can offer additional clues as to the 
sources of these differences in Okun’s coefficients and their 
relationships with labour market institutions. Given that 
𝑢𝑢 ≈ −ln (𝑒𝑒) where u denotes the unemployment rate, and e 
the ratio of employment (N) to the labour force (LF), we have 
𝑑𝑑 ln(𝑁𝑁) =  𝑑𝑑 ln(𝑌𝑌) − 𝑑𝑑 ln(𝑌𝑌/𝐻𝐻) − 𝑑𝑑 ln(𝐻𝐻/𝑁𝑁) with Y being GDP and H being hours worked. 
Then  
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢 =  −𝑑𝑑 ln(𝑌𝑌) + 𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) + 𝑑𝑑 ln(𝑌𝑌/𝐻𝐻) + 𝑑𝑑 ln(𝐻𝐻/𝑁𝑁)    (1) 
 
                                                                            
3  The regression line involves a beta coefficient of -0.44 (t-statistics: -4.19).  
Chart 5 
Unemployment responsiveness to output changes in countries 
with different degrees of dualism 
(percentages) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on OECD data. 
Note: GDP variation is shown on the x-axis, while variation in unemployment is shown on the y-
axis. 
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Chart 6 
Role of intensive, extensive and participation margins in unemployment to output response (2007-2013) 
(log-differences) 
Change in output per hour worked 
 
 
Hence, the Okun’s ratio du/dln(Y) can be decomposed into a 
component related to the participation margin, a component 
related to productivity (per hour worked), and a component 
related to the intensive margin (hours worked per 
employee).4 Clearly, EU countries behaved very differently 
in the way these three components accommodated the 
response to negative demand shocks (Chart 6). This 
heterogeneity in the use of intensive and extensive margins 
also points to the role played by labour market institutions 
during the Great Recession and the euro area crisis. 
 
2.4 Some new 
microeconomic evidence on the nature of shocks  
Okun’s law coefficients control for the size of the aggregate shock, but they are silent on its 
nature, duration, sources and differential incidence across sectors and firms. Microeconomic 
evidence about sources of shocks to firms and their corresponding responses, in terms of 
employment, wages, hours worked and other adjustment mechanisms, is provided by an 
ESCB research network (the Wage Dynamics Network, WDN), which has conducted ad hoc 
surveys on firms. Its most recent wave, covering 25 European countries, was used to measure 
firms’ perceptions of the nature of shocks driving the Great Recession, responses to those 
shocks and the constraints imposed by labour market institutions on those responses.  
                                                                            
4  We take OECD data for GDP, unemployment rate, labour force and GDP per hour worked and obtain hours 
worked per worker as the residual of the equation (1). 
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At the time of writing this paper, only very preliminary third-wave data from the WDN (and 
not for all countries that performed the survey) are available.5 Nevertheless, some interesting 
patterns, which will be further investigated when the whole dataset is compiled and 
harmonised, are emerging.   
Chart 7 
Sources of shocks between 2010 and 2013 according to firms’ perceptions 
(x-axis: percentage of firms suffering a decrease in domestic demand; y-axis: percentage of firms 
suffering a decrease in foreign demand) 
 
 
First, as shown in Chart 7, there is a wide cross-country 
heterogeneity in the nature of the shocks, as reflected in the 
proportion of firms declaring that decreasing demand and 
financial problems were relevant or very relevant during the 
period 2010-2013. There are also noticeable cross-country 
differences in the duration of the negative demand shock, 
being perceived by firms as less permanent in those countries 
where more firms were experiencing decreasing demand. 
Across countries, there is also a positive association between 
the domestic and the foreign components of the fall in 
demand. The likelihood of a lack of finance being perceived 
as relevant by firms is also positively associated to the 
perception of a fall in demand.  
As for the responses to these shocks, there is a clear positive association between the 
proportion of firms suffering a decrease in demand, and the proportion of firms declaring that 
their base wages did not change during the 2010-2013 period (Chart 8a). A similar cross-
country positive association is also observed with regard to the incidence of debt refinancing 
problems. This suggests that wage reductions could have been a way for liquidity-constrained 
firms to borrow from workers.6 Also, given the magnitude of the demand and financial 
shocks, downward nominal wage rigidity seems to be more binding in southern European 
                                                                            
5  We are grateful to participants of the WDN network for allowing us to use these preliminary data, and to Samuel 
Skoda for his help in computing the statistics presented below.  
6  There is also evidence to suggest that credit-constrained firms increased markups as a way of raising internal 
funds (see Montero and Urtasun, 2014, and Gilchrist et al., 2015).  
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countries (France, Spain and Italy) than in eastern European countries (Slovenia, Latvia and 
Estonia) where internal devaluations took place in a less gradual fashion. Finally, in those 
countries where downward nominal wage rigidity was more binding, employment 
adjustments were more prevalent with significant differences between temporary and 
permanent employment in countries with dual employment protection legislation (Spain and 
Italy) and with fewer firms reducing employment in countries, such as Germany, that could 
rely mostly on other margins of adjustment (Chart 8b). 
Chart 8a 
Wage responses to shocks between 2010 and 2013 
(x-axis: percentage of firms with a decrease in demand; y-axis: percentage of firms with lowered 
wages) 
 
(x-axis: percentage of firms with worsening access to financing firm’s activity; y-axis: percentage 
of firms with lowered wages) 
 
Source: Third wave of the Wage Dynamics Network Survey. 
Note: Data are third-wave WDN survey results and as such are very preliminary data.  
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(x-axis: percentage of firms with worsening access to financing firm’s activity; y-axis: percentage 
of firms with unchanged wages) 
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Chart 8b 
Employment responses to shocks from 2010 to 2013  
(x-axis: percentage of firms with a decrease in demand; y-axis: percentage of firms reducing 
permanent employment) 
 
(x-axis: percentage of firms with worsening access to financing firm’s activity; y-axis: percentage 
of firms reducing permanent employment) 
 
(x-axis: percentage of firms with worsening access to financing firm’s activity; y-axis: percentage 
of firms freezing new hires) 
 
 
Source: Third wave of the Wage Dynamics Network Survey. 
Note: Data are third-wave WDN survey results and as such are very preliminary data. 
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(x-axis: percentage of firms with a decrease in demand; y-axis: percentage of firms reducing 
temporary employment) 
 
(x-axis: percentage of firms with worsening access to financing firm’s activity; y-axis: percentage 
of firms reducing temporary employment) 
 
(x-axis: percentage of firms with a decrease in demand; y-axis: percentage of firms freezing new 
hires) 
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Hence, micro data suggest that differences in the characteristics of the demand and financial 
shocks hitting EU countries during the euro area crisis involved different adjustment 
mechanisms. While some countries seem to have had in place the proper institutions to deal 
with the shocks – Germany, for instance, could respond to a temporary shock by adjusting 
working hours – others were in a more difficult position, having to deal with permanent 
shocks, while also facing a credit crunch, implying a large reallocation of resources, and with 
labour market institutions not very likely to facilitate the needed adjustment. 
2.5 Institutions and shocks: learning from outliers 
The above macro and micro evidence points to relevant interactions between shocks and 
institutions (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2002) that have yet to be fully understood. The role of 
these interactions can be characterised by considering the two key outliers in the Okun’s 
relationship, notably Germany and Spain. Without a doubt, the two countries faced shocks of 
different intensities and natures. Yet the asymmetry in the labour market response is quite 
striking. While in Germany adjustment along the intensive margin reduced the response of 
unemployment to the output fall, in Spain it is the decline in labour hoarding (a rise in 
productivity) together with a slight increase in participation and an initial increase in hours 
worked per employee that explains the rise in the unemployment rate.  
This comparison between Germany and Spain highlights the fact that three labour market 
institutions have been particularly important with regard to the characteristics of the 
macroeconomic adjustment observed in EU countries: i) subsidised short-time work, ii) the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, and iii) dualism in employment protection 
legislation (EPL). 
2.5.1 Subsidising reductions in working hours 
Germany activated a variety of instruments concentrated on the intensive margin in its 
adjustment to the Great Recession. First, it increased the scope of subsidised short-time work. 
Second, it used working-time accounts, essentially a scheme allowing firms to borrow from 
their employees. Rather than being paid for overtime worked, the employees earned the right 
to work fewer hours at a later stage. Third, there was yet another margin of adjustment: the 
introduction of mini-jobs increased the scope of multiple job holdings in Germany and this 
helped to prevent outright unemployment for many workers in the event of the loss of a 
primary (or secondary) job.  
Spain did not activate any such schemes. As a matter of fact, while in most OECD countries 
hours per worker reduced during the Great Recession, in Spain hours worked per employee 
actually increased between 2008 and 2010 (see Bentolila, Dolado, and Jimeno, 2012). 
2.5.2 Decentralising bargaining 
Germany decentralised wage setting in the early 1990s and was a pioneer in the introduction 
of “exit clauses”. It could therefore use plant-level “pacts for employment and 
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competitiveness” to enable wage reductions rather than collective dismissals. At least up to 
2011, collective bargaining institutions in Spain were instead imposing wages established at 
“higher” (provincial or sectoral) levels to lower bargaining structures, i.e. plant-level 
bargaining. This de facto prevented wage concessions being traded for more employment 
security as in the agreements signed in Germany at the company level.  
This lack of adjustment of hours and wages to negative shocks in countries with two-tier 
bargaining structures is well documented in previous waves of the WDN survey, in which 
firms were asked whether they would reduce labour costs by cutting hours, wages (either the 
base wage or bonuses) or employment (either temporary contracts or permanent contracts). 
The firms applying plant-level agreements on top of multi-employer ones adjusted 
employment more than wages or hours in response to adverse shocks, unlike firms where 
there was no collective bargaining at all. In fact, about 60% of firms involved in the two 
bargaining levels adjusted mainly employment, just as firms involved only in multi-employer 
bargaining did. Firms where bargaining presumably takes place only at the individual level 
instead adjusted mainly wages in response to adverse shocks. These findings are robust to 
controls for country, sector and size of firms. This suggests that plant-level bargaining in 
two-tier regimes is inefficient in that it does not allow wage concessions to be traded for 
employment security, as in the case of stand-alone plant-level bargaining, concentrating all 
the adjustment on the extensive margin (Boeri, 2015).  
2.5.3 Dual employment protection legislation 
Spain is the land of dual EPL, that is, the coexistence of two different segments in the labour 
market: employees with open-ended contracts and employees with temporary contracts. This 
coexistence generates larger fluctuations in employment than those observed in fully flexible 
labour markets (see Chart 5). Countries with a higher contractual dualism display stronger 
responsiveness of unemployment to output changes. The reason for this role of contractual 
dualism is that employers do not have to pay costs, even in terms of severance payments, to 
dismiss temporary workers as they can simply wait until contract termination and not renew 
their contract. Moreover, the very fact that all the adjustment is concentrated on temporary 
employment de facto insulates workers holding permanent contracts from the consequences 
of negative shocks.7 Large job losses in the temporary worker segment may well coexist with 
wage rises among the permanent contract segment. Something similar happened in the 
Spanish construction sector during the first phase of the Great Recession (2008-2010); while 
about one-third of jobs on contratos temporales were destroyed, workers holding permanent 
contracts continued to enjoy real wage increases. Needless to say, there is something 
fundamentally wrong with a labour market operating in this way. 
3 What went wrong  
Let us summarise the evidence produced so far. High and unevenly distributed 
unemployment in Europe is not only the consequence of asymmetric shocks. It is true that 
                                                                            
7  On the dynamics of employment under dual EPL see Boeri (2010) and Costain, Jimeno, and Thomas (2010). 
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shocks were of varying intensity and nature across countries, but even after controlling for 
these differences, the labour market responses appear to have been different across countries. 
Some countries used the intensive margin of labour market adjustment more, while others 
concentrated their response on the extensive margin. Some countries had bargaining 
structures that allowed for nominal wage cuts preventing mass lay-offs, while others could 
not use wage reductions as an alternative to dismissals. These institutional differences, in a 
context where the inactivity margin was not used – the labour supply of older workers was 
increasing, unlike in previous recessions – turned out to be very important in the differential 
rise in unemployment. Another important factor was labour market segmentation between 
temporary and permanent contracts, allowing wage increases to coexist with large 
employment losses, even within the same sector. 
This does not mean that policies aimed at bringing unemployment down should only address 
these institutional failures, learning from the best (and worst) performers, and forgetting 
about aggregate demand management. It only means that greater attention should be paid to 
the interaction between macroeconomic policies and institutions. Aggregate demand 
management should be better synchronised with institutional reforms if the task is to avoid 
excessive employment destruction. The optimal design of institutions is not independent of 
the underlying cyclical conditions. Some badly needed institutional reforms aimed at 
restoring competitiveness can have undesirable effects in severe downturns, and stabilisation 
policies can reduce the risk of these reforms backfiring. At the same time, labour market 
institutions themselves may have to be designed in such a way as to have counter-cyclical 
properties, and this requires giving some fiscal leeway to countries in a monetary union hit by 
asymmetric shocks. 
In this section we first evaluate what appear to be the most relevant interactions between 
cyclical conditions and the optimal design of labour market institutions, also drawing on 
recent results from the literature. As aggregate demand management in a monetary union 
requires cross-country coordination, we will then consider the way in which fiscal policy 
coordination in the EMU takes into account cyclical conditions. Finally, we will consider 
how conditionality, vis-à-vis stressed countries, was used in the Great Recession and the 
ensuing euro area crisis. 
3.1 The timing of labour market reforms over the cycle 
There is a huge amount of literature on the effects of institutions on labour market outcomes 
(Boeri and van Ours, 2013). This literature typically offers insights as to the long-run effects 
of institutional reforms. Less is known about the effects of reforms at business cycle 
frequencies, notably their effects during downturns.  
One of the key findings of the literature is that during downturns it is generally preferable to 
increase wage flexibility as opposed to employment flexibility. The disemployment costs of 
minimum wages are indeed stronger during recessions, as the setting of the minimum wage 
may not internalise macroeconomic constraints when electoral cycles coincide with business 
cycles. Reforms of collective bargaining, notably those inducing more decentralisation in 
wage setting have been found to increase the correlation of wages with labour productivity 
over the business cycle (Gnocchi et al., 2015). The fiscal costs of minimum wages and 
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collective bargaining also tend to be particularly pronounced during downturns, as displaced 
workers draw unemployment benefits for a relatively long time before finding alternative 
employment. 
In contrast, reforms reducing employment protection tend instead to amplify the 
responsiveness of unemployment to output changes. This is particularly true when these 
reforms involve contractual dualism of the “Spanish type” (Boeri, 2010). Indeed, the 
presence of a stock of temporary jobs built up after a two-tier reform significantly increases 
the response of unemployment to output decline (Bentolila et al., 2012). Gnocchi et al. (2014) 
also find that reforms reducing EPL involve an increase in the volatility of employment. 
Furthermore, Casado, Fernández-Vidaurreta and Jimeno (2015), looking at worker flows and 
at the socio-demographic composition of these flows based on micro data from the European 
Labour Force Survey, find that during the Great Recession a higher proportion of flexible 
temporary contracts were associated with fewer transitions of young and middle-aged 
workers out of unemployment.  
As for unemployment benefits, their optimal level is inversely related to the magnitude of the 
elasticity of unemployment duration to unemployment benefits. The latter is generally found 
to be much weaker during downturns. For instance, according to Kroft and Notowidigdo 
(2014), a one standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate almost halves the 
duration elasticity. This suggests that reforms should possibly increase generosity when the 
unemployment rate increases, and reduce it during expansions. Similarly Landais (2014) 
finds that the labour supply response to unemployment benefits is pro-cyclical, while Jung 
and Kuester (2014) and Mitman and Rabinovich (2014) suggest that unemployment benefits 
should be raised in the aftermath of a negative shock. Overall, it may be desirable to provide 
more generous insurance during periods of high unemployment and reduce benefit generosity 
during periods of low unemployment. This may require a rule-based system, with automatic 
clauses consistent with a fiscal budget balanced automatically over the business cycle 
(Andersen, 2014). 
A similar structure also seems appealing in pension systems. Reforms increasing the 
retirement age steeply while labour demand is declining may backfire as employers stop 
taking on new workers, preventing recessions from being used as cleansing devices 
(Caballero and Hammour, 1994), especially in countries where young workers are better 
educated than incumbents. Some flexibility in retirement age may be desirable when actuarial 
reductions are applied to people retiring before the normal retirement age. Clearly this 
flexibility would increase the annual government deficit, but would not affect the implicit 
debt of pension systems or the intertemporal budget constraint. By increasing public deficits 
during downturns and improving the fiscal balance later on, this actuarially neutral flexibility 
operates as an automatic stabiliser.  
3.2 The drawbacks of the EU fiscal policy framework 
The theoretical and empirical results summarised in the previous section suggest that 
countries badly hit by shocks should not be forced to consolidate immediately, and that the 
fiscal framework should give some fiscal leeway to reforming countries. An environment of 
very tough fiscal consolidation may be inconsistent with an acceleration of structural reforms, 
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not only because such reforms may be politically more difficult, but mostly because they may 
not be desirable under an environment of strong fiscal contraction. 
Table 2 
Conditions under the new EU fiscal framework 
(percentage points of GDP) 
   Required annual fiscal adjustment 
  Condition Debt below 60% and no sustainability risk 
Debt above 60% or sustainability 
risk 
Exceptionally bad times Real growth < 0  or output gap < -4 No adjustment needed 
Very bad times -4 ≤ output gap < -3 0 0.25 
Bad times -3 ≤ output gap < -1.5 0 if growth below potential,  0.25 if growth above potential 
0.25 if growth below potential,  
0.5 if growth above potential 
Normal times -1.5 ≤ output gap < 1.5 0.5 > 0.5 
Good times output gap ≥ 1.5 % > 0.5 if growth below potential,  
≥ 0.75 if growth above potential 
≥ 0.75 if growth below potential,  
≥ 1 if growth above potential 
Source: European Commission. 
EU macroeconomic policy coordination throughout the Great Recession was in clear 
contradiction with the principles stated above. With regard to demand management, fiscal 
policy was constrained by the way the EU policy coordination framework was designed and 
imposed. The fiscal framework at the EU level draws largely on the notion of the natural rate 
of unemployment, i.e. the NAWRU. In particular, in the presence of output gaps exceeding 
4%, temporary deviations from both the deficit and the debt targets are allowed (see Table 2). 
Output gaps are themselves estimated on the basis of the potential labour input, which is 
obtained as follows: Lp = WAPOP * LFPR * (1-NAWRU)*HW where WAPOP stands for 
the working-age population, LFPR for the labour force participation rate, and HW for hours 
worked per employee. The NAWRU itself is estimated applying a Kalman filter to a system 
of two equations estimated simultaneously. The first equation is the Phillips curve (which can 
be estimated with different specifications in different countries) linking wage growth to 
productivity and unemployment, while the second equation delivers the NAWRU itself. The 
measurement and estimation problems related to estimates of the NAWRU in the United 
States (a country with longer series and better measures of inflation than many euro area 
countries) are discussed in some detail in Staiger et al. (1997), Ball and Mankiw (2002) and, 
more recently in the context of the Great Recession, Watson (2014).  
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Table 3 
Dispersion of NAWRU estimates 
a) OECD 
  Coefficient of variation 
 Mean Overall Between Within 
Belgium 7.89 3.6% 3.7% 0.5% 
Czech Republic 7.38 9.7% 1.6% 9.6% 
Denmark 4.91 6.1% 4.8% 3.9% 
Germany 8.04 5.4% 4.8% 2.9% 
Ireland 6.4 20.8% 19.8% 7.7% 
Greece 9.88 6.2% 5.4% 3.3% 
Spain 11.42 14.2% 11.5% 8.7% 
France 8.59 3.0% 1.1% 2.8% 
Luxembourg 3.65 15.4% 8.5% 13.0% 
Hungary 6.85 9.6% 4.4% 8.5% 
Netherlands 3.76 6.5% 3.5% 5.5% 
Austria 4.57 10.0% 10.1% 1.8% 
Poland 15.31 14.9% 3.5% 14.5% 
Portugal 6.48 16.5% 13.3% 10.1% 
Slovakia 15.59 10.6% 2.5% 10.4% 
Finland 8.54 9.4% 3.8% 8.7% 
Sweden 6.84 14.2% 14.5% 1.9% 
United Kingdom 5.63 5.0% 3.0% 4.0% 
b) European Commission estimates 
  Coefficient of variation 
 Mean Overall Between Within 
Denmark  5.0 24.5%   3.3% 24.3% 
Germany  5.9 42.8%   3.7% 42.6% 
Ireland  9.9 38.5%   1.5% 38.4% 
Greece  6.1 44.4%   6.8% 43.9% 
Spain 11.4 36.1%   3.9% 35.9% 
France  7.6 30.1%   2.9% 30.0% 
Italy  8.1 18.3%   3.6% 18.0% 
Netherlands  4.9 34.1%   6.6% 33.5% 
Austria  2.8 39.5%   1.6% 39.5% 
Portugal  5.8 19.7%   2.0% 19.6% 
Finland  6.8 50.1%   2.2% 50.0% 
Sweden  3.6 59.4% 11.2% 58.4% 
United Kingdom  6.7 31.9%    0.8% 31.8% 
Source: Authors’ calculations on OECD and European Commission data. 
Table 3 provides a synthetic measure of the dispersion in the estimates of the NAWRU 
provided by the OECD. In particular, we decompose the total variance in two components – 
one that is related to time variation within any forecast round, and another that captures 
differences across forecast rounds. The message is quite clear: for some countries, including 
Ireland, Spain and Portugal, there are very large confidence intervals around the mean, even 
when only variation within the round (for given policies) is considered. Similar results are 
obtained by using the European Commission’s estimates (Chart 9). 
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Chart 9 
NAWRU estimates for various euro area countries 
European Commission estimates, standard deviation across vintages 
 
 
Needless to say, there is nothing natural about unemployment 
rates that appear to fluctuate so much over time, not only 
between vintages but also within vintages, for given policies. 
All this suggests that the output gap measures used in fiscal 
policy coordination are unreliable.  
Moreover, structural unemployment is also an elusive 
concept from a microeconomic perspective. The empirical 
implementation of measures of (inter-industry, occupational 
and regional) mismatch unemployment (Sahin et al., 2014) 
faces daunting problems of consistency and comparability as 
data on vacancy rates in some countries are meaningless. 
Skills mismatches are also rather poorly defined when 
allowances are made for the skill downgrading of significant 
portions of the workforce (for instance, first-generation 
migrants) and the fungibility of a more educated labour force 
with youngsters being overrepresented in the unemployment 
pool.  
But even supposing that it were possible to disentangle cyclical unemployment from 
structural unemployment and that unemployment in the EU was mainly of the mismatch type, 
strongly increasing labour demand would not be quite as harmful because now the enemy 
would be deflation and wage growth would remain subdued. In fact, if one takes seriously the 
hypothesis that Europe, given its demographic and productivity outlook, is bound to suffer 
from a permanent shortfall in demand (the so-called secular stagnation hypothesis), then 
“there is room for doubt about whether the cycle actually cycles” (Summers, 2014), and 
higher wage inflation would bring the economy closer to the full employment equilibrium 
(see Eggertsson and Mehrotra, 2014; Jimeno, 2015).  
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In summary, cross-country coordination in fiscal policies would be better off taking the 
actual unemployment rates as a reference, rather than being based on unreliable and possibly 
meaningless estimates of structural unemployment or output gaps, whose association with 
inflation and other macroeconomic imbalances may be different in the current 
macroeconomic context than in the standard macro stabilisation manual.  
3.3 Bad conditionality and misguided reforms 
EU conditionality placed a great deal of emphasis on labour market reforms, which received 
much more attention than product market reforms. Even when the diagnostics of 
dysfunctional labour markets were right,8 formal or informal rescue programmes rarely 
addressed the main determinants of poor labour market performance. The key lessons from 
the international experience of labour market reforms were lost in translation. 
Recommendations from international institutions were translated into reforms that backfire 
during recessions, ignoring the issue of contractual dualism, overlooking best practices in 
subsidising short-time work, and not addressing the key issues related to the reforms of 
collective bargaining and pension systems. We offer below three examples, drawing on the 
Italian, Spanish and Greek experiences throughout the crisis.  
Chart 10 
Youth unemployment and employment rates among older workers before and after the Great 
Recession 
(y-axis: unemployment rate (percentage of population aged 15-24), x-axis: employment rate (percentage of population aged 55-64)) 
 
Source: OECD. 
Note: Data from before the Great Recession are marked in blue and those after the Great Recession in yellow. 
In the case of Italy, fiscal consolidation forced the government to reduce the duration of the 
income support schemes for the unemployed at the same time as a pension reform was 
increasing the retirement age. In the midst of a major recession, this left many older workers 
displaced during the Great Recession without the soft landing scheme that had been 
internalised in the collective dismissal agreement (the so-called “esodati” problem), forcing 
the government to adopt a number of ad hoc (and costly) measures to deal with this problem. 
                                                                            
8  See, for instance, Blanchard, Jaumotte and Loungani (2014).  
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As older workers are more protected than young workers, the phasing out of any escape route 
to retirement also helped concentrate even more employment adjustment on youngsters. 
While in normal times there is no “lump of labour” and youth unemployment generally 
declines as employment among older workers increases (blue symbols in Chart 10), 
increasing retirement age and phasing out any bridging scheme to retirement in the midst of a 
major recession may concentrate all the adjustment on young people (red symbols in Chart 
10). 
In Spain, a strong case was made for wage moderation (as opposed to microeconomic wage 
flexibility). The request was also for a stricter control of the budget execution of regional 
governments and for more transparency, timeliness and detail in the publication of monthly 
and quarterly government finance statistics. In fact, during the execution of the financial 
sector rescue programme in 2012 the Spanish government implemented comprehensive 
labour market reforms to provide firms with more flexibility in adjusting their labour force by 
reallocating workers internally, reducing working hours and altering other employment 
conditions, modifying wages for incumbent workers and allowing for more decentralisation 
in wage setting. A pension reform aimed at slowing down the rise of pension expenditures 
was also carried out. Although it seems evident that these labour market reforms may have 
been instrumental in delivering faster wage adjustment and a realignment of competitiveness 
in the Spanish economy, they did not successfully address contractual dualism and only 
mildly affected wage flexibility at the microeconomic level. As for the pension reforms, they 
were far from guaranteeing the actuarial neutrality in pension systems that was needed to 
adjust the labour force smoothly in times of recession and very far from restoring the long-
term sustainability of Spanish pensions.  
Finally, in the case of Greece, the Memorandum of Understanding asked for fiscal austerity 
and welfare cuts to consolidate public accounts, and wage reductions to restore 
competitiveness. This was done by cutting the coverage of unemployment and health 
benefits, reducing the minimum wage by between one-third and one-quarter and increasing 
retirement age. No reference was made to measures to promote economic efficiency and 
enhance productivity. The imposition of these policies on an economy with such profound 
structural weaknesses as Greece exacerbated the social impact of the crisis by harming in 
particular the less protected segments of the population and spreading poverty in a country 
where levels of wage, income and wealth inequality were already high (Matsaganis, 2013). 
Overall, within the three cases reviewed above, the key policy actions were i) wage 
moderation, ii) reductions in severance pay and, more broadly, the strictness of employment 
protection, and iii) increases in retirement age. References to either contractual dualism or to 
schemes inducing more adjustment along the intensive margin, such as short-time work or 
working-time accounts, were either less emphasised in the recommendations by international 
institutions or “lost in translation” when national governments acknowledged these 
recommendations. The possibility of introducing actuarial reductions to early retirement 
rather than forcing a rapid increase in the retirement age was also overlooked, and, in any 
event, prevented by the objective of obtaining immediate reductions in public pension 
outlays. 
In summary, there are reasons to believe that labour market reforms were generally 
implemented without learning from the heterogeneity in labour market responses to shocks in 
 22 
the euro area, and not taking into account the fact that fiscal measures and labour market 
reforms that are effective in normal times may not be desirable during major recessions. 
3.4 Moral hazard 
A final lesson learnt from the recent experience is how to use the fiscal constraint as a device 
to induce institutional reforms. Relaxing the fiscal constraint during a recession was deemed 
to exacerbate moral hazard problems in a monetary union. A typical (and topical) concern 
when discussing the implementation of labour market reforms is indeed that governments are 
less willing to do so without being constrained by a strong fiscal restriction. However, our 
analysis suggests that this argument is ill suited for a number of reasons. 
First and foremost, the effects of structural reforms are not independent of cyclical 
conditions. Some reforms may be desirable only during upturns and would deliver higher 
unemployment than in a no-reform scenario during downturns. This is particularly the case 
for EPL, but unemployment benefit and retirement plan reforms should also be fine-tuned to 
take into account cyclical fluctuations. 
Second, the types of reforms that are desirable during downturns are typically those that 
involve higher public expenditure. This is the case, for instance, for the short-time work 
schemes used in Germany to mitigate the effects of the Great Recession. Many countries, 
including the United States, also made their unemployment benefit systems more generous, a 
reform that is not within the realm of possibilities for countries forced to carry out a major 
fiscal consolidation in the midst of a recession. By the same token, flexicurity reforms that 
substitute employment protection (involving severance payments by firms) for 
unemployment benefits (paid out of social security contributions and general government 
revenues during recessions) require some fiscal room, particularly during a recession. Finally, 
reforms operating on the intertemporal budget constraint, which is relevant for pension 
systems, are inconsistent with fiscal consolidation targeting the yearly public deficit.  
Third, although the institutional framework put in place in the EU to deal with policy 
coordination has been somewhat enhanced during the crisis, there is still a long way to go to 
make its implementation more efficient. A better way to exert EU conditionality is to go 
directly to citizens and promote best-practice institutions.  
4 How EU conditionality can help governments reduce 
unemployment 
There is still a lot of ground to cover in improving labour market institutions in Europe, and 
supranational authorities have a crucial role to play in this reform process. The cross-country 
divergence in unemployment evolutions is not a reason to strengthen the country-specific 
dimension of employment policies. Quite the opposite; the difficulties faced by governments 
in introducing best-practice institutions highlight the resistance to reforms by powerful 
interest groups favouring the status quo.9 In this context, more active involvement of the 
                                                                            
9  On this topic it is very enlightening to read Fornero (2013). 
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European Commission in the design and implementation of labour market policies is 
essential. At the same time, these reforms have strong effects on income distribution and may 
require those losing out to be compensated. Thus greater involvement of the EU would be 
acceptable to governments of Member States only if it goes hand in hand with adequate 
funding from European employment programmes. This supranational funding, if well 
designed, could also lessen the institutional shortcomings of some of the countries and play a 
stabilising role across the euro area. As is the case with access to fiscal leeway, it is more 
about using the carrot than the stick.  
4.1 Towards positive conditionality  
In order to establish other conditionality mechanisms that could operate without reducing the 
scope of structural reforms, we propose three such supranational “positive conditionality” 
schemes, as opposed to the negative conditionality used to date. These schemes are designed 
i) to be partial complements of national programmes, not substitutes for them, ii) to solve the 
moral hazard issue as access to the European programmes is conditional on accepting new 
rules for EPL, wage setting and entitlements to unemployment benefits, and iii) not 
necessarily to imply either large expenditures or permanent transfers across countries. 
Moreover, a key ingredient of our proposals is the partial and gradual introduction of 
individual accounts, so that the benefits of implementing the programmes go directly to the 
workers, rather than to governments, social agents and other intermediaries. And as a result 
of such benefits being fully portable across national jurisdictions, they would be perceived as 
EU-wide entitlements and would also reduce some barriers to transitory labour mobility, 
which could also play a role as a stabiliser in the event of asymmetric shocks.  
4.1.1 The European employment contract for equal opportunity 
Labour costs, including high and uncertain firing costs, are often singled out as the main 
reason why employers refrain from hiring workers under the regular full-time/open-ended 
employment contract. This is particularly true in the countries where EPL reforms progressed 
“at the margin”, not by changing employment conditions for the regular contracts, but by 
introducing other types of “atypical” contracts, usually either part-time or fixed-term 
contracts. The inefficient turnover generated by this reform strategy seriously impedes 
productivity growth (Bassanini et al. 2014; Boeri, Garibaldi, and Moen, 2015). 
Facing similar problems (and an acute pension funding problem), Austria successfully 
implemented an EPL reform in 2002 by introducing individual savings accounts. In the new 
regime, severance pay does not depend on the reasons for terminating the contract and is 
covered by the employers’ contributions (1.53% of the salary) into a fund. In the case of 
dismissal after three years of tenure, the employee can choose between either receiving the 
funds accumulated in their account or saving them for a future pension.10   
                                                                            
10  For more details, see Hofer, Schuh, and Walsh (2011).  
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The reform experience during the European crisis shows that no significant improvements 
were achieved in the reform of inefficient EPL or in the correction of labour market 
segmentation, even when EPL reforms were mandated under a formal rescue programme. We 
believe that an alternative strategy based on the Austrian system could have been more 
successful. 
Let us examine how it could work. The European Commission would design a new single 
open contract with severance pay gradually increasing with worker tenure, just like in the 
new open-ended contract introduced in Italy, effective since March 2015. The contract comes 
with individual savings accounts into which both employers and some European funds 
(Structural Funds combined with the European Social Fund) contribute. Employers get some 
reduction in severance pay obligations and some reduction in labour costs (as European 
contributions also play the role of deferred wage subsidies). Workers gain from more stable 
jobs (and from the wage subsidy). Additional European funding to be put towards active 
labour market policies or unemployment insurance could also be implemented through 
contributions to the individual accounts. 
4.1.2 The European unemployment insurance programme 
The lack of automatic stabilisers operating at the EMU level has been evident throughout the 
crisis. At the same time, “solidarity” and the promotion of social and economic cohesion 
among Member States are explicitly stated goals of the European Treaties. Thus, 
unemployment insurance implemented at the central level could be an attractive 
development, insofar as it could deliver on both fronts (i.e. the absorption of asymmetric 
shocks and the promotion of economic convergence).11 However, current unemployment 
insurance schemes in many European countries are far from optimal as there is inadequate 
management of moral hazard issues on both sides. On the one hand, the search activity of 
insured workers may be affected by entitlements. On the other hand, the financing of benefits 
does not always make employers internalise the social costs of unemployment. Moreover, 
introducing an EMU-wide unemployment insurance scheme when labour market 
performance and institutions are as heterogeneous as highlighted in previous sections may be 
counterproductive.  
Nevertheless, there is a simple way to overcome these problems – by making the 
unemployment insurance scheme available only to those countries that achieve substantial 
progress towards a better design of labour market institutions. As in the case of the European 
employment contract, the implementation of this scheme could be eased by the introduction 
of individual accounts that could make unemployment benefits portable across countries, 
complementing the national insurance schemes. This European unemployment benefit could 
also be operated in conjunction with the equal opportunity contract in order to improve 
employment incentives (Brown, Orszag and Snower, 2008) and introduced as a partial 
complement to national unemployment schemes. As shown by Dolls, Fuest, Neumann and 
Peichl (2014), with proper contingency and claw-back mechanisms this European 
                                                                            
11  References to previous proposals along these lines include Delpla and Gourinchas (2014) and Claeys, Darvas and 
Wolff (2014). 
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unemployment insurance scheme does not need to imply substantial permanent transfers 
across countries, while it does preserve some redistributive and stabilising properties.  
4.1.3 Actuarial neutrality and the portability of pension rights across 
jurisdictions 
Public pension systems across the EU differ substantially from one another. Some of these 
systems have recently been reformed to achieve long-term sustainability, while others are still 
accumulating an increasing and potentially explosive (implicit) pension debt. EU fiscal 
coordination should force governments to make this implicit debt explicit, at the same time as 
informing citizens about their future pension rights. One way to do this would be to require 
social security administrations to produce personalised pension projections that would be 
disclosed to all contributors along the lines of the Swedish orange envelope experience 
(Sunden, 2014). These projections could then be aggregated at the country level to produce 
not only projections of total pension expenditures, but also entire distributions of pension 
outlays for particular groups of individuals. This information is essential for evaluating not 
only the financial but also the social sustainability of public pension systems, hence the 
potential spillovers of pension reforms into other social transfer schemes.  
It would also be sensible to use these projections in fiscal policy coordination at the EU level, 
allowing for temporary increases in public pension outlays during recessions, provided that 
these increased expenditures are compensated by larger savings later on and that they do not 
have an impact on the overall pension debt. This would be an important step towards 
improving the cyclical properties of labour market and social policy institutions and 
enhancing the intertemporal and long-run dimension of the EU fiscal framework at the same 
time.  
In this context, reforms introducing a level of pensions which is at least compatible with self-
sufficiency and actuarial reductions to pensions obtained before the retirement age would no 
longer be unattainable by countries facing adverse shocks. This flexibility in retirement age 
could soften the cost of adjustment to macroeconomic shocks while rejuvenating the 
workforce. The fact that differences in the age of retirement involve actuarially neutral 
adjustments also makes the full portability of pension rights across jurisdictions sustainable 
and intra-EU bilateral agreements among social security administrations more transparent. 
Workers could move across jurisdictions, cumulating pension rights that would be paid by 
the administrations where the contributions were collected, based on the country-specific 
rules. Given the presence of actuarial reductions, differences in the retirement age across 
jurisdictions would not prevent this full portability, as they do not affect the long-term debt of 
the single national administrations involved.  
5 Final remarks 
Unemployment in Europe is becoming more and more country-specific. Asymmetric shocks 
combined with cross-country institutional differences have resulted in highly heterogeneous 
effects on national labour markets. It is difficult to foresee a united Europe and a properly 
functioning Economic and Monetary Union with so much cross-country divergence in labour 
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market conditions and very limited instruments to insure unemployment risks across 
countries. 
European supranational institutions throughout the crisis over-emphasised the realignment of 
external competitiveness by relying on wage reductions, not realising that these reductions 
are most costly when they have to be achieved by nominal wage cuts (given the low inflation 
rate), households are highly indebted, and governments had to reduce public consumption, 
investments and transfers to consolidate public debt. When structural reforms were 
implemented, either at the initiative of national governments or of countries under formal 
programmes, they focused on reducing the costs of dismissals and forcing downward wage 
adjustments in the middle of a recession, rather than on removing structural impediments to 
productivity growth in poorly regulated labour markets. The international institutions with 
the capacity to apply some of their own initiatives to change the orientation of reforms and 
employment policies (for instance the European Commission) did very little in this respect 
and failed to design new programmes at the supranational level. 
In this paper we offer some proposals to change this state of affairs, looking forward to an 
enhanced role for European supranational institutions in improving the functioning of labour 
markets. In this regard, we call for European employment policies to complement not 
substitute national policies in the areas of EPL, unemployment insurance and pension 
entitlements. They would be introduced under positive conditionality, offering different (and 
we believe more effective) incentives for national governments to introduce badly needed 
structural reforms. And, finally, they would target EU citizens rather than governments or 
local administrations or intermediaries, meaning they would be more transparent and socially 
acceptable.  
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